Core Concepts
Green Compute Certificate
The certificate binds two independent proofs to one job — a privacy attestation and a carbon attestation — both referencing a staked, slashable node.
Shape
json
{
"job_id": "ea_9f3a...",
"node_id": "node-7f3a", // staked, slashable
"model": "ealna-glm",
"privacy": {
"mode": "TEE", // TEE | FHE | MPC
"attestation": "0x...", // hardware/crypto proof
"data_exposed": false
},
"carbon": {
"energy_source": "solar",
"grid_gco2_per_kwh": 41, // live, hour-matched
"energy_kwh": 0.0123,
"est_gco2": 0.50
},
"hour": "2026-07-03T14:00Z",
"serial": "GCC-000128401", // no double-counting
"status": "verified", // verified | fallback | degraded
"settlement": { "rail": "x402", "asset": "EALNA" }
}Fields
- privacy — the enclave mode and a signed attestation that data was never exposed.
- carbon — energy source plus the live, hour-matched grid intensity and metered kWh.
- serial — a serialized id so a certificate can be retired once and never double-counted.
- node_id — the staked node accountable for both proofs.
Verifying
Certificates are returned with the result and are queryable in the explorer. The SDK verifies each one locally — you don't have to trust the gateway's word for it.
Why it's defensible
Copying one proof is easy. Reproducing the joint, verifiable, slashable pair — privacy bound to carbon, tied to a staked node, plus the network already producing it — is not. That bound pair is the protocol's central claim.