Core Concepts

Green Compute Certificate

The certificate binds two independent proofs to one job — a privacy attestation and a carbon attestation — both referencing a staked, slashable node.

Shape

json
{
  "job_id": "ea_9f3a...",
  "node_id": "node-7f3a",       // staked, slashable
  "model": "ealna-glm",
  "privacy": {
    "mode": "TEE",              // TEE | FHE | MPC
    "attestation": "0x...",     // hardware/crypto proof
    "data_exposed": false
  },
  "carbon": {
    "energy_source": "solar",
    "grid_gco2_per_kwh": 41,    // live, hour-matched
    "energy_kwh": 0.0123,
    "est_gco2": 0.50
  },
  "hour": "2026-07-03T14:00Z",
  "serial": "GCC-000128401",    // no double-counting
  "status": "verified",         // verified | fallback | degraded
  "settlement": { "rail": "x402", "asset": "EALNA" }
}

Fields

  • privacy — the enclave mode and a signed attestation that data was never exposed.
  • carbon — energy source plus the live, hour-matched grid intensity and metered kWh.
  • serial — a serialized id so a certificate can be retired once and never double-counted.
  • node_id — the staked node accountable for both proofs.

Verifying

Certificates are returned with the result and are queryable in the explorer. The SDK verifies each one locally — you don't have to trust the gateway's word for it.

Why it's defensible

Copying one proof is easy. Reproducing the joint, verifiable, slashable pair — privacy bound to carbon, tied to a staked node, plus the network already producing it — is not. That bound pair is the protocol's central claim.